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Legal Scholarship as Spectacular Failure
Omri Ben-Zvi & Eden Sarid*
Most authors of legal scholarship would probably hesitate to describe
their writings as heroic tales of (intellectual) conquest and adventure.
They would also most likely deny that they are unreliable storytellers.
Equally, conventional accounts of legal scholarship tend to view it as
lacking a common structure. This article challenges these assumptions by
offering a novel aesthetic perspective on legal writing. We argue that
most legal essays are modeled on a narrative device known as "the hero's
journey," in which a protagonist (the scholar) overcomes a particularly
frightening menace (the legal problem), and returns home with the bounty
(the legal solution). However, there's a twist: legal theorists are
institutionally conditioned to treat this story suspiciously, looking for
false and misleading features, thus (perhaps unconsciously) treating the
narrator as unreliable. By exposing these common literary patterns, this
essay also reveals a unique and as-of-yet unexplored trade-off between
two different qualities of legal scholarship: the more unreliable the reader
finds the legal article, the greater the aesthetic pleasure she derives
therefrom. Consequently, many legal articles are, in a way, beautiful
failures. That is, unsuccessful attempts to convince their readers of the
truth of their theses that nevertheless resonate with their readers
aesthetically. This essay explores these ideas and explains their
implications, from both a law & literature and philosophical perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
What is the value of legal scholarship? Why do legal academics
continue to devote themselves to the project of producing scholarly prose,
primarily dedicated to the exploration and resolution of legal puzzles?
A cynic might reply that the institution of legal scholarship serves the
powerful by reaffirming the status quo and ensuring that power stays
where it has historically resided.' However, several other, more positive
accounts have been suggested in scholarly debates on this issue. For
example, some believe that legal scholarship creates a meaningful
conversation about legal puzzles, which results in a thriving liberal
polity.2 Others propose that engaging with legal scholarship may help in
understanding how legal issues are thought about and discussed, thus
helping the readers develop certain analytic skills.3 According to other
accounts, legal scholarship provides courts, legislators, practitioners, and
others with arguments that they can use in policy making or adjudication.'
And some contend that legal scholarship is preoccupied with the
discovery of the truth and the promotion of knowledge.'
In this essay, we explore and defend a novel take on the value of legal
scholarship. We argue that legal scholarship is valuable for aesthetic
reasons. It holds significant aesthetic value (at least most of the time).
Moreover, we claim that this type of aesthetic value may be higher the
less legal scholarship achieves its more ordinary goals, with the prime
example being knowledge production. We will not define "aesthetic
value" precisely, except to note that aesthetic value is the value that
1. See e.g., Richard Posner, The State of Legal Scholarship Today: A Comment on Schlag, 97
GEO. L. J. 845, 849 (2008) ("fields that provide a significant service function in a university will
retain their place even if they are intellectually weak').
2. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Marketplace of Ideas. 90 YALE L. J. 1131 (1981), Richard A.
Epstein. Let 'The Fundamental Things Apply": Necessary and Contingent Truths in Legal
Scholarship, 115 I IARV. L. REv. 1288, 1312-1313 (2002).
3. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship. 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1330 (2002) ("My
own view is that, for scholars in a professional school, at least part of the mission is to advance
understanding and promote improvement of their profession and its institutions. For legal academics,
this includes all of the contexts in which law is developed, enforced, interpreted, and practiced.").
4. Id. at 1338-39 ("[O]ne of the most important functions of legal scholarship is to expose the
historical, structural, and ideological underpinnings of current legal norms and to assess their social
value. . . . [S]Ich work can nonetheless contribute to informed policymaking and help shape the views
of students who could someday guide reform efforts."). See also, Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth:
A Theoy for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REv. 889, 903-04 (1992).
5. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education. 90 YALE
L. J. 955, 967-68 (1981) ("The defining characteristic of scholarship is its preoccupation with the
discovery of truth. The end of scholarship is the discovery of truth and the promotion of knowledge. .
. . To understand the world as it truly is-this, and nothing else, is the goal of scholarship."). The
question of what knowledge is, and what its value is, is raised in Plato's Aleno and is a subject of
current philosophical debate. See generally JOHN HAWTHORNE. KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES (2004);
JONATIIAN L. KVANVIG, THE VALL[E OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE PURSUIT OF UNDERSTANDING (2003):
TIMoTHY WILLIAMSON, KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS (2002).
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inheres in good pieces of art.6 Picasso's Guernica has significant aesthetic
value, as does Shakespeare's King Lear. For our purposes, to say that an
object has aesthetic value is to say that the object is enjoyable or
important qua a piece of art. We rely on an intuitive understanding of the
term "aesthetic value." Though enjoyment is relevant to aesthetic value,
we do not discuss whether enjoyment constitutes aesthetic value, or
whether it simply indicates some other attribute of the work that generates
aesthetic value on independent grounds that do not rely on the subjective
feeling of enjoyment.
The suggestion that legal scholarship as a whole possesses aesthetic
value might seem peculiar at first. After all, most pieces of legal thinking
are not readily enjoyable as works of art. Perhaps some articles are more
artistic than others, but the field as a whole seems ill-suited to possessing
aesthetic value. And indeed, most approaches to law & literature do not
conceptualize legal scholarship as an object of inquiry. They focus,
instead, on other aspects of law (like court proceedings and legal
opinions).' We argue against this intuitive understanding by discussing
the manner in which two literary devices-a popular narrative structure
and a powerful literary technique-supply much aesthetic value to the
typical piece of legal scholarship (or TPLS). To the extent that the literary
devices we identify have aesthetic appeal (and we believe they do), legal
scholarship (as such) is valuable on aesthetic grounds.8
We argue, then, that phenomenologically speaking, TPLS (a) utilizes a
specific narrative structure; and (b) employs an important literary
technique.'
We term this structure the hero's journey, echoing Joseph Campbell's
famous narrative category.'0 This is a very old and established narrative
structure, in which a protagonist (like a knight) overcomes a major
obstacle (like a dragon) and achieves something coveted and important
(like saving a village in distress, or finding a lost treasure). Many stories
6. Here too several philosophical approaches are possible. See, e.g., MONROE C. BEARDSLEY,
THE AESTHETIC POINT OF VILw (1982): MALCOLM BUDD, VALUES OF ART: PAINTINO, POETRY. AND
MuSIC (1995): ALAN H. GOLDMAN, AESTHETIC VALUE (1995); MATTHEw KIERAN, REVEALING ART
(2005): FRANK SIBLEY. APPROACII TO AESTHETICS (B. Redfern Benson, & .1. Cox eds., 2001); R.A.
Sharpe. The Empiricist Theory oflArtistic I 'alue. 58 J. AESTHETIC & ART CRIIIsM 321 (2000).
7. See, e.g., Rhode. supra note 3, at 1327 ("We reflect endlessly on the deficiencies of other
participants in the legal culture-judges. legislators, lawyers. and government officials-but rarely
devote similar attention to our own inadequacies.")
8. It is important to note. however. that aesthetic value may be achieved in legal scholarship via
other narrative instruments. We do not deny this, though we focus on what we perceive as a common
narrative structure that contributes to most legal articles' aesthetic appeal.
9. See Pierre Schlag, The Law Review Article. available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2746650 at 1047 ("The basic idea is that the very
form of the law review article is stylized and thus ineluctably enacts, narrows, and channels what can
be said and thought.").
10. See JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE HERO WITIH A THOUSAND FACES (2d ed.. 1968).
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are based on this literary mold, from the tales of Moses and Buddha to
Aladdin, The Lion King, The Hobbit. and Star Wars. We suggest that,
appearances notwithstanding, TPLS implicitly relies on this kind of
narrative structure, though with an intellectual twist: in legal scholarship,
the protagonist is the author, the danger to be overcome is the legal puzzle
or problem that the article seeks to resolve, and the treasure is the solution
offered. TPLS is thus a tale of how a danger was averted, and it is told
after the journey has ended-the article is written after the problem has
been solved. In Part LA, we offer this reading of TPLS as a kind of hero's
journey. We demonstrate our claim by analyzing two recent examples of
TPLS and by applying our thesis to this essay as well.
But there is another twist to the story, for TPLS is not an ordinary
hero's journey. An additional literary device-the unreliable narrator-
applies as well, complicating things. In stories that utilize this technique,
the information supplied by the narrator (eventually) comes into question
and the reader is left to piece together the truth of the matter based on
clues and other points of view supplied in the text. Stories with unreliable
narrators are quite common in modern literature (like Agatha Christie
novels, Lolita, and The Life of Pi), and they hold considerable aesthetic
value, for they engage the reader in a unique way: once she understands
or suspects that the narrator is unreliable, she (the reader) is turned into a
quasi-detective herself, and consequently must do more than passively
consume the text.'' Part LB is devoted to explaining this literary
technique.
The upshot, which we explore in Part II, is this: TPLS is
phenomenologically conceptualized as a hero 's journey told by an
unreliable narrator. TPLS presents readers with a story of success-an
important puzzle is resolved, a novel theory is established, a normative
solution is now at hand. In short, the knight has returned home with the
bounty. But because of the way the legal academy is structured,
competent legal academics are conditioned to read the piece with
suspicion, and to seek out clues that the narrator is conveying false
information. Thus, the reader hypothesizes that the dragon was not
actually slain, or that there was no dragon to begin with, or that the
treasure-chest is in fact empty. In reading TPLS (this essay included), one
is constantly trying to figure out what is wrong with the hero's journey
that is narrated. Discovering the flaw and unmasking the knight as a
11. We acknowledge that there is, of course, a difference between the author (the person who
actually wrote the piece: for example. Yann Martel in YANN MARTEL. LIFE OF Pl (Alfred A. Knopf
Canada ed., 2001)) and the narrator (the person telling the story; Pi Patel). However, in TPLS.
seemingly, both are almost always the same person. The author of the piece is also the narrator (note
that many TPLS are written in first person). In line with common terminology, throughout this essay
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failure brings with it great aesthetic value.
Why should it matter that TPLS has this type of aesthetic value? We
believe that our thesis has two important implications-both for the field
of law & literature and for understanding the unique dynamic of aesthetics
and knowledge in law. First, the literature on law and narrative rarely
addresses legal scholarship, and in the rare instances in which it does, it
assumes that legal academic texts do not share a unifying structure and
that they do not include any reference to their author.12 As Part 11 makes
clear, we challenge both these assumptions and argue that TPLS has a
common structure and narrative in which the author-narrator is very much
present.
Second, our theory sheds light on a unique dynamic within legal
research and writing-an exchange of value between aesthetic quality and
knowledge production in TPLS. In essence, the less successful a reader
finds a piece of legal scholarship in reaching its explicit or implicit goal of
knowledge production, the greater the aesthetic enjoyment she derives
therefrom. This novel counter-intuitive principle implies that legal spheres
experiencing stagnation when it comes to knowledge production might in
fact be seen as generating considerable aesthetic value. We show that
several prominent legal spheres suffer from this problem. Consequently,
our theory suggests that there is a need for a reevaluation of these spheres,
in a manner that also takes into account the currently hidden value that
stems from failed attempts to generate knowledge. This argument is
discussed in the latter section of Part 11.13
1. TPLS AS LITERATURE
We now turn to examine our claim that TPLS is modeled in a specific
manner that usually generates aesthetic enjoyment. This part discusses
two literary instruments that allow for the generation of this type of value.
A. The Hero's Journey
Joseph Campbell has provided a description of a narrative structure that
is common to many literary works. From Biblical stories to The Matrix,
we seem to be fascinated by the same basic tale, though the details of the
12. Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 141, 151 (1997)
(claiming that the story that TPLS tells about the author is "a story of invisibility").
13. We have deliberately waited until this point to address a possibly concerning aspect of our
argument: our use of the term "legal scholarship." Generalizing about legal scholarship. as Meir Dan-
Cohen observed. "is bound to ignore important distinctions." Meir Dan-Cohen. Listeners and
Eavesdroppers: Substontive Legal Theory and Its Audience, 63 U. Cow. L. REV. 569, 569 (1992).
We agree. However, we have clarified that our investigation involves a certain predicament-that of
knowledge creation-and that our thesis does not apply to all legal scholarship or understandings of
what legal scholarship does (see further discussions above and in Part II). We proceed with the use of'
the term "legal scholarship" with this limited context in mind.
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narrative change: "It will always be the one, shape-shifting yet
marvelously constant story that we find."14 The meta-structure, the
"inonomyth," is described in the following manner:
A hero ventures forth from the world of common day into a region
of supernatural wonder: fabulous forces are there encountered and
a decisive victory is won: the hero comes back from this
mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons on his
fellow man.15
"The hero's journey" is thus composed of three stages-separation,
initiation (or conflict), and return.'6 In the first phase, the hero senses or is
told that something is wrong with the peaceful world she knows: a
monster, a tyrant, a natural disaster, or a disease is posing a threat
(however, note that the threat may be a new one or an old one, but in any
case, unaccounted for)." The hero then embarks on a mission to rectify
the problem. To complete the journey, the hero will have to venture into
the threatening and the unknown, and face dangers of various kinds-and
the fact that the protagonist is willing to sacrifice herself in the pursuit of
justice and peace is the reason for treating her as heroic. Finally, after the
monster is slain, the hero returns and shares the bounty with the rest of
society.'"
Campbell's thesis is mostly descriptive and structural, that is, he aimed
to capture the manner in which many classical and modern stories and
myths are presented.'9 However, "the hero's journey" has become a
prescriptive thesis as well. Hollywood writers, for instance, follow
14. CAMPBELL. supra note 10, at 3.
15. Id.at30.
16. See ROBERT JEWETT & JOHN SHELTON LAWRENCE, THE AMERICAN MONOMIYTH, at xix-xx
(1977). For a similar (though more abstract) account, see TZVETAN TODOROV. THE POETICS OF
PROSE 11 (Richard Howard trans.. 1977) (explaining the "minimal complete plot"). See also Baron &
Epstein, supra note 12 (on the definition of a "story").
17. The important point about the first stage of the hero's journey is thus limited to becoming
aware of a danger, whether new or old-thus generating a need to react, through a heroic jouney.
Consequently, situations in which an old threat suddenly surfaces evince the idea of "blissful
ignorance": the protagonist lived happily because she wasn't aware of the gravity of the danger that
was threatening her. For example, think of the movie ARMAGEDDON (Touchstone Pictures 1998). A
meteor has been progressing towards Earth for some time, though the protagonists were blissfully
unaware of it. Another example is the movie THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999). The protagonist first
becomes aware that he has lived his entire life unaware of grave dangers, at the beginning of the
narrative.
18. JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE HERO'S JOURNEY: JOSEPH CAMPBELL ON HIS LIFE AND WORK 123
(1990) ("The usual hero adventure begins with someone from whom something has been taken, or
who feels there's something lacking in the normal experience available or permitted to the members
of his society. This person then takes off on a series of adventures beyond the ordinary, either to
recover what has been lost or to discover some life-giving elixir.").
19. On this type of structural analysis in literature, see RONALD A. CHAMPAGNE, THE
STRUCTURALISTS ON MYTH: AN INTRODUCTION (1992). See also HANS BERTENS, LITERARY
THEORY: THE BASICS, ch. 2-3 (2014); PAUL H. FRY, THEORY OF LITERATURE (2012); GLOBAL
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Campbell's idea,20 and today it is common knowledge that "Campbell's
theory indirectly shapes and delimits the expectations of audiences,
critics, and storytellers."2' Consequently, many current movies and
television shows are modeled on the myth of a hero who sets out to
obliterate a danger that plagues the rest of mankind.22 This is why it is
plausible to assume that "the hero's journey" is a narrative structure with
clear aesthetic value-we enjoy hearing stories that feature a protagonist
that overcomes adversity in this manner. Again, as this is not an essay on
aesthetics, we do not wish to explain exactly why "the hero's journey"
resonates so deeply with our collective subconscious and brings us joy-
we only note that it does, and that as a consequence, stories that are
modeled on "the hero's journey" have significant aesthetic appeal.
Many law review articles draw on the narrative structure that is
expounded in "the hero's journey." Our comments on this matter are
focused less on the "objective" structure of TPLS (assuming, that is, that
such a thing as an objective narrative structure exists, and that it can be
attributed to texts, including legal texts). Instead, we want to claim that
the legal community as a whole perceives TPLS as modeled on the myth
of "the hero's journey." The difference is that this essay's argument is
centered on the manner in which our collective legal consciousness
structures TPLS, as opposed to arguing that there is something objective
in TPLS itself that we simply come in contact with. In other words. this is
a claim about us, the readers of TPLS, and our shared consciousness.
"The hero's journey" functions as a presupposition that guides our
readings when we engage with TPLS.
In legal scholarship, the tripartite structure of separation, initiation, and
return is translated into the realm of the theoretical. Accordingly, each of
the three parts of the story has a TPLS-corollary that takes on the part's
typical characteristics, but in a way that is suited for matters of the mind.
Thus, we get: (i) an original state of peace, threatened by the theoretical,
normative, or empirical problem: (ii) an intellectual journey; (iii)
disentanglement of the problem and return to peace.
TPLS is usually framed as a solution to a problem. The main driving
force, which explains why the article was written, and why it deserves to
be read, is that some difficulty-whether theoretical, empirical, moral, or
otherwise-will stay unresolved if we disregard the solution that the
20. See CHRISTOPHER VOGLER. THE WRITER'S JOURNEY: MYTHIC STRUCTURE FOR WRITERS
(1992).
21. Brett M. Rogers, Heroes Limited, in CLASSiCS AND COMICs 73, 74 (C.W. Marshall & George
Kovacs eds., 2011). See also ROBERT JEWETT & JOHN SHElTON LAWRENCE. THE MYTH OF THE
AMERICAN SUPERHERO, at xix-xx (2002).
22. See MICHAEL E. SALLA, THE HJERO'S JOURNEY: TOWARD A SECOND AMERICAN CENTURY
(2002): STUART VOYTILIA, MYTH AND THE MOVIES: DISCOVERING THE MYTHIC STRUCTURE OF 50
UNFORGETTABLE FILMs 20 (1999).
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article offers.23 The legal community is implicitly depicted as living
peacefully until the legal problem disrupts the status quo. The rest of the
article is then devoted to the journey itself-showing how the difficulty is
overcome. In the article's conclusion, the author usually explains that the
community can return to its prior condition of peaceful existence. In sum,
TPLS enlists the author as the protagonist, while the menace is
represented by the legal problem, and the legal solution symbolizes the
bounty.24
Note, again, that our claim here is not about the actual state of mind of a
specific author of TPLS. Instead, the argument is about the
phenomenology of reading TPLS. That is, the common structure of
thought that readers share when they engage with TPLS as academics.25
More specifically, we claim that something like "the hero's journey" is an
implicit structural assumption that we share as legal academics, and that
this assumption acts as an important "frame-setting"26 that guides our
interaction with pieces of legal scholarship. Moreover, readers also
approach TPLS with a skeptical perspective. That is, readers subliminally
assume (ex-ante) that the author is wrong in her propositions. We further
discuss this claim in Part I.B.
When we read a new TPLS, as Schlag notes, we already assume that
"the hero's journey" is the type of story that is narrated to us, and,
because we are institutionally conditioned to think this way, it takes
strong evidence to convince us otherwise.27 Here, too, we are not
interested in examining why this is the case, since this is not a paper on
the sociology of the legal academy.28
Let us now demonstrate our thesis by giving three examples of "the
hero's journey" in legal writing. The first example was chosen
randomly-this was the latest article published in the Harvard Law
23. See Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990); Schlag,
supra note 9,
24. This notion is perhaps also reflected in the bias against publishing negative results. Imagine a
piece of legal scholarship that claims the problem it identified was actually not a problem in the first
place or that it does not suggest a solution, or one that claims others have already solved the problem
properly. The reader might find this piece boring (despite the fact that the piece might be extremely
important in other ways).
25. For a discussion of phenomenology in law, see Omri Ben-Zvi, Zombie Jurisprudence, in IN
SEARCH OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT (Justin Desautels-Stein & Christopher Tomlins eds.,
forthcoming 2017). See also Justin Desautels-Stein & Duncan Kennedy, Foreword, Theorizing
Contemporary Legal Thought, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1. at i (2015).
26. See Schlag. supra note 9.
27. Though this does happen. See. e.g., Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 23;
Pierre Schlag, My Dinner at Langdell's, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 851 (2004).
28. This point hopefully clarifies a possible confusion regarding where the "unreliability" rests.
Indeed, the narrator in the TPLS is an "unreliable narrator," but her unreliability stems neither from
her state of mind while writing the article nor from the limits of creating knowledge inherent to legal
scholarship in general, but rather from the reader's (conceivably subconscious) state of mind when
reading the piece. See also Part l.B.
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Review at the time this article was written. The second example was
chosen because it represents a leading methodology (analytic
philosophical analysis). It addresses an important subject in evidence
law-statistical evidence-and was published recently in a leading law
review. These examples show that "typical" in TPLS by no means implies
average quality. The third example-this article-was chosen because we
are part of the phenomenon we are trying to describe.
The first example is Systemic Facts: Toward a New Institutional
Awareness in Criminal Courts by Andrew Manuel Crespo.29 It deals with
the manner in which criminal courts regulate institutional actors, such as
prosecutors and police officers. The article's central claim is that courts
are unjustly viewed as unfit for regulating law enforcement behavior, and
that a closer look at the way criminal courts collect and utilize "systemic
facts"-that is, facts about the criminal justice system itself-may help
the reader better understand the role of courts in the regulation of criminal
law. For obvious reasons, we will not address the merits of the argument.
Instead, we wish to focus attention on the way the investigation is framed,
and more specifically on the journey that the reader is invited to follow.
It does not take long for the framing to begin-in the very first words of
the article, we learn of the trouble that haunts the once-peaceful land of
criminal adjudication: "A troubling tension has come to define
constitutional criminal law, that large and ever-growing body of
jurisprudence that serves as the principal mechanism for regulating
American law enforcement."30 Note how this sentence situates the reader
in a specific narrative, by hinting at the old state of peace that supposedly
existed before the "troubling tension" came to define constitutional
criminal law. The story that unfolds is thus about finding a way to reach
the desired state of tranquility that the hero once knew and that now
eludes her. This is the first part of the tripartite heroic narrative-
"separation"-in which we are introduced to the monster, and given the
motivation for the journey.
How can we solve the problem that lies at the root of current
constitutional criminal law? The author challenges existing solutions that
rely on non-judicial regulative bodies and offers a different way to solve
the problem. His solution is to explore the manner in which "systemic
facts"-facts about the criminal justice system itself-are chronicled and
utilized by criminal courts. Systemic facts are currently under-explored in
the literature, but this is not a problem for the article. On the contrary,
herein lies the source of the article's power. We need to embark on a
29. Andrew ManIel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward a New Instittional Awareness in Criminal
Courts. 129 HARV. L RLv. 2049 (2016).
30. Id. at 2050.
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journey in order to conceptualize, understand, and then correctly employ
these systemic facts-a journey through unexplored territory is needed to
solve the problem. And note that the journey is depicted in terms very
similar to those of Joseph Campbell ("a region of supernatural wonder"),
and for good reason-the journey must be depicted in a manner that will
elicit the right aesthetic response. Crespo claims that "systemic facts
occupy a space beyond the familiar and canonical concepts of
adjudicative facts and legislative facts first introduced by Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis over half a century ago."3' The idea of a place
beyond the familiar, an unexplored land,32 provides the perfect setting for
the "initiation" or "conflict" part of the journey, namely, the part of the
narrative in which strange and new entities are met and overcome. In the
article's words, "[i]dentifying such a pathway toward criminal courts'
enhanced institutional capacity is this Article's primary aim."33 Indeed,
finding a "pathway" through the "place beyond the familiar" is the exact
narrative structure Campbell identified.
Finally, we get a description of the treasure that awaits at the end of the
journey. The author has already found the treasure, for he has completed
the journey, and now our task is only to recognize this accomplishment:
If criminal courts continue to allow this specialized institutional
knowledge to lie dormant, they will merit the critique that they
have failed to live up to their institutional responsibility as
proponents of systemic criminal justice. If, however, criminal
courts are able to acquire, collect, and organize their systemic
facts; to report them to litigants, other vested institutional actors.
and the public; to enlist expert assistance where necessary to
access and understand them; and to proactively encourage the
integration of such understanding into the judicial process, then
criminal courts could well gain the capacity to participate, at a
systemic level, in budding efforts to reform the failed criminal
justice state over which they now preside.34
The monster, the conflict, the treasure-it is relatively easy to discern
these three stages of the heroic journey in the article. This narrative
structure helps situate us as readers. We know roughly what to expect as
the narrative continues. And we are hooked. Regardless of what one
thinks of the criminal justice system and of systemic facts more
specifically, this type of story is exciting, as it echoes traces of stories we
have heard or read since birth. This is the monomyth, retold in an
31. Id. at 2052.
32. Id. ("Scholars to date have failed to appreciate just how much of this information exists-or
how valuable it can be.").








The second example, Sense and 'Sensitivity': Episteinc and
Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence, attempts to give a new
account of why courts and legal scholars view statistical evidence with
suspicion.35 The authors argue that this suspicion stems from the fact that
statistical evidence fails to meet the "sensitivity" condition, according to
which a belief must be counterfactually sensitive to the truth in order for
us to justifiably call the belief "true." However, the article also claims that
"sensitivity" is not a required condition in legal matters, and offers
another, incentive-based reason for treating statistical evidence with
suspicion. The article claims that this suggestion has considerable
descriptive power vis-A-vis current evidence law, and may also be used
normatively, as a criterion for legal reform.
Here too we shall be concerned only with the narrative structure of the
argument, and not its merits. The heroic journey starts, yet again, with a
troubled landscape-a legal field plagued by a problem:
"For nearly twenty years, law journals have been the forum for a
bitter debate about the use at trial of overtly probabilistic evidence
and methods," wrote Jonathan J. Koehler and Daniel N. Shaviro in
1990. More than two decades have passed since then, but these
words still hold true. Despite the voluminous body of literature
dedicated to the issue of statistical evidence, it continues to
generate great controversy in evidence law scholarship. Questions
regarding the admissibility and sufficiency of statistical evidence
arise in court with ever-growing frequency, with seemingly
inconsistent reatment in the case law. The aim of this Article is to
dispel some of the confusion surrounding the use of statistical
evidence in the legal arena . . .31
Note that here, too, the framing begins in the very first words of the
article, signifying how important it is for authors to situate the reader in a
very specific type of space-one plagued by a problem that threatens our
well-being. The problem is depicted as having "depth" and "gravity," 7
and the authors spend considerable time explaining why past attempts to
solve the problem have failed (while noting that their survey could be
much longer, as it "is not intended to be either conclusive or
comprehensive in scope"38 ). The point, of course, is to indicate that the
obstacles are great, and that a truly heroic act has to be undertaken, in
order to succeed where others have failed: "The inconsistent treatment of
35. David Enoch & Talia Fisher, Sense and Sensitivity : Epistenic and Instrumental
Approaches to Statistical Evidence. 67 STAN. L. REV. 557 (2015).
36. Id. at 559.
37. Id. at 565.
38. Id. at 571: see also id. at 565-571.
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statistical evidence in both legal doctrine and the evidence law literature
has created a need for an overarching theory."3 1 Someone must step up
and defeat the monster.
As we stated earlier, in TPLS the heroic journey is entirely intellectual.
This example illustrates this point well, because here the problem to be
solved is less in the tangible world, and more in our theoretical
understanding of it. Most people are unwilling to give statistical evidence
much weight in court, but that in itself is not the problem. Rather, the
challenge is to explain whether and why this practice is justified. Framed
this way, the narrative's hero is the legal theorist. In this case, the journey
will take the reader to the realm of epistemology, the philosophical field
that deals with questions of knowledge. After exploration and conflict in
this space, at the end of the journey, we return to the land of evidence law
with the treasure-a newfound understanding which allows us to dispel
the difficulty that has plagued this land. Now we can neatly explain why
evidence law takes its current doctrinal form,40 and provide suggestions
for legal reform.4 '
Finally, our third example is this very essay.4 2 We engage in this
exercise in order to demonstrate that the narrative structure of an
argument can be analyzed without analyzing the argument's merits.43
We will now mention the essential markers of our own hero's journey.
Our introduction begins with an attempt to problematize the current
situation-to convince the reader that there are hidden insights regarding
legal scholarship that no one, including the reader, has noticed. The
important point to note is that this problem is the main driving force of the
entire piece: without a sense of danger there is no need to embark upon a
journey to a new understanding. And in this case, the journey takes the
reader to the lands of phenomenology and literature analysis-which are
foreign, and beyond the usual scope of most legal scholarship (which is
why we spend some time explaining the terms we use throughout the
paper). The upshot of the paper is presented both as a direct consequence
of the journey, and as a coveted bounty: a new understanding regarding
legal academia, which the reader did not have before the journey.
We now turn to discuss the second literary device which is used by
legal scholars, and which gives TPLS its distinctive character: the
unreliable narrator.
39. Id. at 564.
40. See id. at Part Ill.
41. See id. at Part lV.
42. Cf Jerry Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. L. REv. 869, 921-927 (1988) (another self-
applying argument).
43. We are aware that since this essay is itself a TPLS. our readers are likely to treat this claim as
unreliable. We discuss this later.
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B. The Unreliable Narrator
Life of Pi tells the story of how the narrator, Pi Patel, survived for
hundreds of days at sea after a shipwreck.4 4 The story is quite fantastic-
Pi explains how he managed to stay alive on one lifeboat with a zebra, a
hyena, and a Bengal tiger (among other animals). At the end of the book,
the readers learn that there is another, equally (or perhaps more)
believable version of the story, in which people, not animals, survived on
the lifeboat with Pi. In this version, the animals mentioned throughout the
story represent he character traits of the survivors. Pi refuses to say which
version is correct.45 Life ofPi is fundamentally about belief and the power
of faith, and because of this, the narration is designed to mask the actual
events, in an effort to make the reader question whether it is important to
know exactly what happened. Many other stories include narrators who
are confused, mentally ill, deceived, or deceiving.46 In narratology, this
phenomenon is known as "the unreliable narrator."47 Anyone who reads
an engaging story that features an unreliable narrator should recognize the
immediate aesthetic appeal of this literary instrument: the suspicion of
unreliability generates a new type of relationship between the reader and
the text, and forces the reader to become much more active in sifting
through the details of the story in an effort to figure out what is true and
what is false.
One could argue that the idea of an unreliable narrator does not apply to
TPLS, because the narrator's unreliability is usually the author's explicit
choice, and most authors of legal scholarship wouldn't choose to be read
as unreliable.48 However, in literary theory, narrative unreliability may
also be the audience's interpretative technique employed in an effort to
make sense of the text.49  Thus, "[i]n assessing the narrator's
44. See MARTEL. supra note 11.
45. Id. at 350.
46. See Dorrit Cohn, Discordant Narration. 34 STYLE 307 (2000), for a discussion of the
distinction between factual and normative unreliability.
47. One of the first studies of unreliability in narration is WAYNE BOOTH. THE RHETORIC OF
FICTION (1961). After Booth, many literature critics have taken up this idea and studied it from a
variety of angles. See, e.g., AMIT MARCUS. SELF-DECEPTION IN LITERALRE AND PHILOSOPIIY
(2007); WILLIAM RIGGAN, PICAROS, MADMEN, NAILS. AND CLOWNS: THE UNRELIABLE FIRST-
PERSON NARRATOR (1981): Manfred Jahn. Frames. Preferences, and the Reading of Third-Person
Narratives: Towards a Cognitive Narratolo, 18 POETICs TODAY 441 (1997): Tamar Yacobi,
Package Deals in Fictional Narrative: The Case ofthe Narrator's (UntReliability, 9 NARRATIVE 223
(2001).
48. For an exception, see Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go. supra note 23.
49. Note that our position is based on the idea that one cannot diflerentiate neatly between what
the author -originally- puts into the text and what the reader does with it after it is "completed." Of
course, there are many nuances to this view, which we wish to avoid adjudicating. For example. some
believe that the author and the reader mutually constitute the "completed" text together. See. e.g.,
Wolfgang Iser, The Reading Process: 4 Phenomenological 4pproach. 3 NEw LITERARY 1-IIST. 279
(1972). Others think that the reader is much more instrumental in creating the text's meaning. See.
e.g., STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETATIVE
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(un)reliability, the reader projects his own comprehension of human
psychology and history, as well as the literary conventions with which he
is familiar, on the narrator's evaluations and descriptions."50 Indeed,
unreliability can be ascribed to an entire sub-genre" of works that
generate the textual and contextual hints that make unreliability their most
rewarding reading.52
In this subsection, we argue that his is exactly what has happened with
the manner in which legal academics read TPLS. As anyone trained as a
legal academic will know, the idea of deep skepticism of others sits at the
core of our phenomenological experience of the legal world, and
conditions us, as legal academics, to approach new pieces of alleged
knowledge as only prima facie solutions. Legal academics are so used to
the idea of different competing theories, that the idea of each new
intervention being only partly true and prone to many difficulties and
objections serves as a pre-interpretive supposition that animates the way
we approach TPLS: every facet of our engagement with legal scholarship
assumes this epistemic deficiency, to the point that reading TPLS
becomes an attempt to vindicate our preconception. As Schlag notes:
There is nothing quite like the exhilarating experience that comes
from reading a provocative new piece of legal thought. Of course,
at some point this exhilaration will give way to ennui as the new
piece of legal thought unravels-ultimately to be classified as yet
another possibly clever, perhaps thoughtful, but nonetheless
utterly failed contribution. One characteristic feature of our own
postmodern condition is the breakneck speed with which the
second experience succeeds the first. From exhilaration to failure,
the distance has been reduced to a couple of sentences.53
Indeed, even brief introspection will reveal that this is in fact the way
many legal scholars often experience legal discourse.54 What tends to
COMMUNITIES (1980). The important point for the purpose of this essay is that the reader's response
to the text is an important part of what generates the text's meaning in the first place. See generally
ELIZABETH FREUND, THE RETURN OF THE READER: READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM (1987).
Theoreticians who disagree with us on this point may regard our claims about narrator unreliability as
interpretative, rather than narrative.
50. MARCUS, supra note 47, at 81.
51. See Per Krogh Hansen, Reconsidering the Unreliable Narrator. 165 SEMIOTICA 227. 242
(2007) (arguing that "the genre, to a very high degree, establishes a horizon of expectations for the
reader that, in large part, predetermines the meaning of the text"). See generally JAMES PHELAN.
LIVING TO TELL ABOUT IT: A RHETORIC AND ETHICS OF CHARACTER NARRATION (2005).
52. MARCUS, supra note 47. at 89 (-unreliable narration may gradually become an automated
device").
53. Schlag. Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 23, at 167.
54. Approaching scholarship with pre-interpretive suppositions is not unique to legal scholarship.
Researchers have demonstrated that similar phenomena exist in other fields as well-these may be
similar to those in legal scholarship (supposing that each new intervention is probably partially true),
or may involve other pre-interpretive suppositions. See, e.g., Charles Bazerman, Physicists Reading
Physics: Schema-Laden Purposes and Purpose-Laden Schema, 2 WRITTEN COMM. 3, 14 (1985)
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happens when we first lay eyes on a new article regarding contract law,
intellectual property, or constitutional adjudication? We usually engage
with these sorts of texts within a framework of problem-seeking, not
problem-solving: we assume that the argument presented is riddled with
problems, and the act of reading is infused with an urgency to identify and
catalogue them."5  Thus, the identification of passages containing the
author's questionable claims is central to engaging with TPLS.56
It is hard to give a concrete example of narrator unreliability in TPLS,
because our claim is one about the reader's state of mind when
approaching the nuances of a given text, and we wish to avoid the task of
specifying the details of yet another random article." But, happily, we
have a convenient example at hand-this essay. Surely, reading this text
has prompted the type of response we have described: reading critically.
Dear Reader, have you not been going back and forth between our
argument, and your ideologies, methodological inclinations, moral
suppositions, and analytic frameworks-and checking whether any of
these can defeat the details of our thesis? And is this exercise not
(arguing that physicists approach a text either to educate themselves about an unknown topic, in
which case they are "likely to read trustingly and uncritically," or, as is the more common case, to
consider the piece against theirs. in which case they approach the piece critically and judgmentally):
Ken Hyland, Persuasion and Context: The Pragmotics of Academic M1etadiscourse, 30 J. of
PRAGMATICS 437, 447-48 (1998) (discussing. inter alia, how different academic communities
approach texts, and noting differences between microbiology and astrophysics, and applied linguistics
and marketing). See also Nat Bartels, How Teachers and Researchers Read Academic Articles. 19
TEACHING AND TCHR. EDUC. 737 (2003) (arguing that researchers approach academic texts critically
whereas teachers approach them in the pursuit of using the findings in their practice).
55. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 4, at 892 (noting "[h]ow rarely a legal scholar reads another
scholar's work simply to learn something" and how authors "generally evaluate whether such works
are good or bad, right or wrong, even as we read them for the information they contain").
56. This is not to suggest hat this is the only way in which readers engage with legal scholarship.
We agree with James Boyd White that "reading. like writing, is not the same for all of us, and the
differences deserve attention and respect." James Boyd White, Why I W4'rite, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1021. 1022 (1996). We are well aware that there are other ways or methods by wAhich readers
approach legal scholarship. For example, there are approaches that emphasize finding where the
author is right or helpful, some readers simply enjoy reading well-crafted arguments. and so on.
However, this problem-seeking approach seems to be common when legal academics read legal
scholarship. See Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go. supra note 23: Schlag, supra note 9. Indeed.
the idea of legal scholarship as a conversational process has long been acknowledged. See James
Boyd White, The Desire for feaning in Law and Literature, 53 CURR. LEGAL PRODS. 131, 134
(2000) ("[T]he most significant intention of the legal author is not that a particular result obtain, but
that the text be read in a certain way. In fact, both as readers and as writers the primary desire we have
is . . . that something be done with the text. that it become the occasion of a certain kind of attention
and thought and conversation. in a certain community of understanding and value.").
57. This perhaps reflects, albeit in a different fashion, the literary form of "the tragic hero": a
protagonist embarks on a mission but eventually fails in achieving her goal. -lowever, unlike the
tragic hero in classic literature (e.g., SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS REX (Elizabeth Osborne, ed., J.E. Thomas,
trans.. Prestiwick House, Iic. 2005): SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE (Paul Woodruff. trans., lackett
Publishing Company, Inc. 2001): WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE. FIAMLET (Barbara Mowat & Paul Westein.
eds., Simon & Schuster 1992)), in 'PLS failure is not the consequence of the actions or misfortune of
the protagonist. but rather the consequence of the way in which her reader eads her text. See PATRICE
PAVIS, DICTIONARY OF THE THEAIRE: TERMS, CONCEPTS, AND ANALYSis 414-18 (Christine Shantz
frans., 1998).
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aesthetically pleasing-or, in other words, intellectually fun? 8
II. THE UPSHOT
We are now in a position to spell out more explicitly the main thesis of
this essay. As a phenomenological matter, the act of reading and engaging
with a piece of legal scholarship presupposes a certain structure of
consciousness. This structure facilitates our experience of working with
the legal text, by giving us a certain directionality and situating us in a
certain space.9 Also, this structure is a feature of the Anglo-American
legal academy (and we do not venture to explain why this is the case).
The structure of the experience of reading a law review article is this:
the legal text we read is modeled on the dynamic of a heroic journey
involving a struggle, in our case the struggle between a protagonist-the
author-and a monster-the legal problem. Most pieces of legal academic
discourse are thus tales of how order and peace return (or ought to return)
to our realm, now that the monster has been vanquished, and the treasure
retrieved. However, the story is almost never accepted as reliable, and the
presupposition of unreliability provides us with a certain motivation and
directionality vis-a-vis the article. Belief in the unreliability of the tale
generates the desire to seek evidence for this belief. Thus, the reader will
often read the legal academic article (perhaps subliminally) in search of
something very specific-the places where the narrative breaks down and
stops supporting the author's thesis.
This complicated phenomenological structure has immense aesthetic
potential. TPLS is a story about heroism, which is exciting, but it is also
an act of deceit, and as such it motivates the reader to go on her own,
separate journey in search of truth. The literary stakes are high, as TPLS
asks us to believe that the author has performed an extremely rare deed-
and the higher the stakes, the more exciting the reading becomes.
Consequently, in TPLS the myth of the hero and the literary form of the
tragic hero (the hero's fall) are infused into one structure, and the reader
vacillates between admiration and disbelief. The result is a unique literary
structure that draws on both the hero's journey and the narrator's
unreliability but cannot be reduced to either: the former suggests that the
author is an unsuccessful hero, the latter suggests that the author is an
58. As an aside, we note that using a self-referential example does not make our account
unfalsifiable. Our thesis may be falsified in many ways, including by demonstrating that the legal
academic mind does not aim to find flaws in TPLS.
59. See. e.g.. Charles Bazerman, Systems of Genres and the Enactment of Social Intentions, in
GENRE IN THE NEw RHETORIC 67 (Aviva Freedman & Peter Medway eds., 1994) (maintaining that a
shared sense of genre allows readers to understand what it is that the writer wishes to convey),
Carolyn R. Miller. Genre as SocialAction. 70 Q. J. SPEECH. 151 (1984) (arguing that genre is in fact a
social act that creates meaning).
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unsuccessful hero. No wonder we like to read and write TPLS.
Our thesis has two main ramifications. First, this way of looking at
TPLS sheds light on an important but underexplored aspect of the field of
law & narrative: the narrative structure of legal scholarship. As we
mention in the introduction, studies that focus on the narrative structure of
law have discussed many aspects of the legal world, but have largely
ignored legal scholarship. Scholars have analyzed, in depth, the narrative
structure of court proceedings (e.g. testimony), court rulings, law codes,
specific statutes, and even law itself.60 Baron and Epstein's article, which
does deal with legal scholarship, assumes that each article tells a
fundamentally different story, one focused on the law under discussion."
Another approach has been to explore how legal scholarship is successful
in introducing "outsider" voices into the legal world.62 In our account,
however, there is much more in common among pieces of legal
scholarship than is often recognized. TPLSs usually share underlying
phenomenological presuppositions that animate a very specific type of
reading and engagement. TPLS is a distinct literary category-a hero's
journey told by an unreliable narrator-that is worthy of attention.63
Second, and perhaps more importantly, our account provides a new
understanding of an as-of-yet unexplored tradeoff between different
valuable aspects of TPLS.64 In the next subsection, we argue that the less
60. See. e.g., PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS. RHETORIC AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS (1987); Peter Brooks, The Future of Confession, I L. CULTURE & HUMAN. 53
(2005): Monika Fludemik, A Narratology of the Law? Narratives in Legal Discourse, I CRITICAL
ANALYSIs L. 87 (2014): Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth and Trial, 101 GEO. L.I. 281 (2013);
Greta Olson, Narration and Narrative in Legal Discourse. in HANDBOOK OF NARRATOLOGY Vol. 1.
371 (2d ed., Peter Huthn, Jan Christoph Meister, John Pier & Wolf Schmid, eds., 2014): Simon Stern.
Narrative in the Legal Text. Judicial Opinions and Their Narratives, in NARRATIVE AND METAPHOR
IN LAw (Michael Ilanne & Robert Weisbera, eds.. forthcoming 2017); Robert Weisberg, Proclaiming
Trials as Narratives: Premises and Pretenses, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RIETORIC IN THE
LAW 61 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds.. 1996).
61. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g.. Peter Brooks. Narrative Transactions-Does the Lair Need a Narratolog,?, 18
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2006); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo s Final Chronicle: Cultural Power, the
Law Reviews. and the Attack on Normative Jurispiidence, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 545 (1995): Marc A.
Fajer, Authoritv, Credibility. and Pre- Understanding: A Defense of Outsider Narratives in Legal
Scholarship, 82 GEO. L.J. 1845 (1994).
63. Though we are unaware of any study that suggests that the particular common narrative
structure of the hero's journey (and moreover, the unreliable hero's journey) is found in other
academic fields. the notion of a common narrative structure is probably not unique to legal
scholarship. See, e.g., Bazerman, supra note 59; 1 lyland, supra note 54 (discussing comion narrative
structures in several academic fields).
64. We do not suggest that all law review articles that fare poorly in generating epistemic value
will necessarily succeed in gencrating aesthetic value. Some succeed in both, some fail in both. Many
things can explain that, but exploring this question is not the purpose of this paper. Instead, we wish
to note that TPLS's aesthetic value is enjoyable like a piece of art's (see our introduction). And just
like with art. people often come across a piece that does not generate any (or generates very little)
aesthetic (and epistemic) value. or that generates high epistenic and aesthetic valLes. Also. faring
poorly in epistemic and aesthetic terms does not at all mean that the piece of legal scholarship, or
piece of art, does not exhibit other types of value.
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successful TPLS is as a knowledge-producing instrument, the better it
fares as an aesthetic artifact-that is, as an unreliable hero's journey. This
is an important insight because it is relevant to how we ought to perceive
several legal fields which are today (arguably) facing an epistemic crisis,
in the sense that the fields ostensibly experience difficulties in producing
legal knowledge. The next subsection explains this situation and
demonstrates how our analysis might change the way we view such legal
fields.
In order to understand what it means for a field to suffer from an
epistemic deficiency, we return to one type of value of legal scholarship
that we briefly mentioned in the introduction: the generation of legal
knowledge. Knowledge is important for many reasons which we will not
explore at length here. We assume that, just as it is valuable to understand
the laws of physics that allow planes to fly and the biological and
chemical theories that ground modern medicine, so it is important to
understand the nature of contractual obligation, or the effects law has on
the impoverished, and so on (and indeed, knowledge may be important
also on intrinsic grounds). It is fairly common to assume, then, that legal
scholarship produces important knowledge that we utilize in various
ways.65 We call the type of value that stems from generating legal
knowledge epistemic value.66
Framed this way, the difference between epistemic and aesthetic values
becomes apparent. A object, such as a work of fiction, has epistemic value
to the degree that it provides new knowledge-for instance, about life or
the social world. And it has aesthetic value to the extent that we find it
enjoyable or important as art. The two values are usually independent: a
scientific paper written in a telegraphic manner may have considerable
epistemic value and little aesthetic value, while a painting may be highly
enjoyable or important without generating information about the world.
This understanding of episternic and aesthetic values is helpful in
analyzing a phenomenon attributed to several legal spheres in which
researchers are experiencing an epistemic deficit-from their point of
view, legal scholarship is generating little significant legal knowledge.
These spheres suffer from what we call the standoff-such a sphere is
riddled with different plausible theories that have all been shown to be
65. Kronman, supra note 5, at 955; Rubin, supra note 4, at 894. Other accounts, of course, exist.
See, for example, James Boyd White, Legal Knowledge. 115 HARV. L. REv. 1396, 1397 (2002)
(explaining that law is not a body of knowledge that can be reduced to propositions or rules: its
primary object is not truth, as if it were a kind of science, but justice). Also see our introduction.
66. This is not to suggest that knowledge is the only thing that has cpistemic value. Insight,
appreciation, understanding, and so on might also have epistemic value. In fact, even aesthetics
generate some epistemic value. [lowever, this is irrelevant to this paper's argument: we are
investigating knowledge creation in legal scholarship, not the meaning of epistemic value.
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inadequate. Each theory can competently critique rivals, but is unable to
defend its own internal coherence, moral relevancy, or adequate fit with
its subject matter. The result is theoretical stagnation. In spheres that
experience the standoff, legal scholarship produces intellectual products
which are options that seem inadequate in important ways (and this
inadequacy is often clear even to those who endorse the inadequate
theory). Moreover, the introduction of new theories usually does little to
help. More often than not, whenever a new purported legal solution,
technique, or theory is presented, it is quickly subjected to overwhelming
criticism from major players in the field, with the result being that the
new solution is unmasked as just as problematic and question-begging as
the old positions. And so the standoff continues.
As we illustrate below, several central spheres of legal research are best
described as existing in this state of standoff. Needless to say, this is not a
good situation if one cares about epistemic value. Despite the investment
of talent and hard work, knowledge production in law is still deemed by
some as a "fraught endeavor that is in some fundamental ways
misguided."6' It is important to stress that he standoff does not entail that
the theories are false. Rather, the standoff entails the claim that the
theories are insugficient to guarantee knowledge: we do not know which
of the theories are true, or which parts of which theories are true. The
predicament is one of knowledge production, not of radical doubt. Of
course, many legal problems have been settled by courts and legislatures,
but that is beside the point-we are asking if legal scholarship has
demonstrated to us whether the solutions adopted are right or justified,
and to this question it is hard to give a positive answer in a state of
standoff.68
We wish to stress that we do not offer a definition of "knowledge"
according to which the standoff is anathema to knowledge-creation. What
knowledge amounts to is a difficult conceptual question, and one can
plausibly argue that in this sphere too there is an intellectual standoff (a
second-order standoff) between rivaling positions. For example, in his
overview on the concept of knowledge, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa notes
that, "the attempt to analyze knowledge has received a considerable
amount of attention from epistemologists, particularly in the late 20th
Century, but no analysis has been widely accepted. Some contemporary
epistemologists reject the assumption that knowledge is susceptible to
67. Pierre Schlag, The Knowledge Bubble- Something Amiss in Expermopia. in IN SEARCH OF
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOLGHT, supra note 25 (manuscript at 4) (available at
htips://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cltin?abstract-id=2741144).
68. Cf Rhode, supra note 3, at 1339-40 (arguing that when done well. legal scholarship can be
very helpful to practitioners in understanding judicial decisions, and to policyrmakers in assessing the
implications of courts' decisions: yet "too much" of it is "-not done well').
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In lieu of a formal definition that will conclusively prove our point, we
rely on a set of intuitions that are widely shared, both by us and by
practitioners in the fields discussed. According to this common implicit
understanding, although we can say many things about a field's objects of
inquiry from a variety of viewpoints, these assertions are subject to harsh
critique, contradict one another, and do not add tip to any one coherent
understanding. The result is that we cannot say that we know a whole lot
about the field's object of inquiry, only that we suspect certain things; and
there is no adequate basis for deciding which of our suspicions is
correct.7 0 We demonstrate that this is the case in several fields; we hope
that the shared intuitive self-understanding of those who actually partake
in the relevant scholarship is a sufficient indication that a state of standoff
creates problems from a knowledge-creation perspective.
Many (though certainly not all) fields of legal studies are today
experiencing this kind of standoff." In this part, we supply two examples
to demonstrate our thesis: jurisprudence and contract theory. However,
the same point is true of other branches of law as well, such as torts, 2
constitutional theory,13 intellectual property,7 4 and so on.
First, jurisprudence. For five decades, jurisprudence has been
69. See Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, The Analysis of Knoiledge. SIAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Feb. 6, 2011), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/.
70. See Epstein. supra note 2. at 1294-99.
71. See Rubin, supra note 4, at 896 ("The failure to agree upon a substantive position does not
represent an unfortunate or temporary disarray within the field. but a central feature of [legal
scholarship] as a whole.').
72. See. e.g.. J.C.P. Goldberg, Tirentieth-Centirr Tort Theory. 91 GEO. L J. 513. 581 (2002)
(surveving existing tort theories and concluding that "[w]hat is needed then, and what we do not find
in twentieth-century tort theory, is a theory that really is grounded in the laws of tort"). See also
Epstein. supra note 4. at 1298-99 ("In tort law, it is exceptionally difficult to come up with one
dominant solution, which perhaps explains why so many different versions of comparative negligence
have been tried and found wanting."). James Goudkamp & John Murphy, The Failure of Universal
Theories of Tort Law, 22 LEGA. THEORY I (2016); Arthur Ripstein, Tort Law in a Liberal State, I 1.
TORT L.. 1 (2007) (noting. inter alia, the lack of agreement as to the purposes of tort law): Arthur
Scott, The Searchfor a Grand Unified Theory of Tort Low. 130 HARv. L. REv. 942 (2017).
73. See. e.g., RICHARD POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 324-46 (2008): Frank L. Michelman.
Thirteen Easy Pieces, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1297 (1995) (surveying the landscape of constitutional theory
found in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995)); Posner, supra note 1, at 853.
74. See William W. Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property. in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL &
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (providing an overview of the
'struggles among and within" the four major IP theories. arguing that "the proponents of all four of
the leading theories of intellectual property purport o provide lawmakers with answers." but that,
"[u]nfortunately. all four theories prove in practice to be less helpful in this regard than their
proponents claim. Ambiguities, internal inconsistencies, and the lack of crucial empirical information
severely limit their prescriptive poser"). See also Neil Wilkof. Theories ofIntellectual Properly: Is I
Worth the Elfbrt? 9 J. INTELLECTUAL PROP, L. & PRAC. 257 (2014) (noting that none of the IP
theories "can really provide a one-stop shop for conceiving intellectual property." and proposing that
"[tihe reader can decide whether achieving . . . 'conversation' merits the effort of seeking to develop
'theories' of intellectual property").
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dominated by the disagreement between positivism and non-positivism,
often referred to as the Hart-Dworkin Debate.5 The debate has become
extremely nuanced and complex; both Hart and Dworkin have responded
to criticisms, 6 and others have tried to offer more sophisticated versions
of positivism and non-positivism to meet the challenges specified in the
literature.7 Today, it is hard to even understand where we are in the
dialectic without a "guide to the perplexed" that surveys almost 50 years'
worth of highly sophisticated philosophical debate.
Where has the debate led? Not so far from where it began, apparently.
Theorists today believe that "neither side can be right,"7 9 and that "for far
too long, the field has been preoccupied by a question that is poorly
formed." 0 Now, we want to resist the temptation of saying exactly why
both sides can't be right: to do so would be to buy-in to the idea that there
has to be some knowledge production, and that our analysis can make
sense of it in just a few lines. Instead, our purpose in this part is
descriptive and not interpretative: we want to show that jurisprudence is
in a position of standoff. Thus, it suffices to show that analytic legal
philosophers themselves believe that their field is stagnating and does not
by and large generate new knowledge. And for this there is ample
evidence. Currently, jurisprudence is considered by many philosophers to
be stale and uninteresting,8 1 and the reason for the malaise is precisely
that little intellectual progress has been made.2
In contract law, the standoff is also considered a fact of life.83 Several
theories of contract are considered "prominent," and these supply answers
to the major questions regarding contractual liability: its moral grounds,
its scope, and its connection to other branches of law. It is common to
classify "major" theories into four groups: promise, reliance, economic
75. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986): H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d
ed., Paul Craig Ed., 2012).
76. See HART, supra note 75, at 238-76 Ronald Dworkin, Hart 's Postscript and the Character of
Political Philosophy, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2004).
77. See, e.g., JULES COLEMAN, ToE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE (2001); EXPLORING LAW'S EMPIRE:
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN (Scott Hershovitz ed.. 2006): JOSPEH RAz, TIHE
AUTHORITY OF LAW (2nd ed., 2009).
78. See Scott J. Shapiro, The Hart-Dworkin Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in
RONALD DWORKIN 22 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007).
79. SCOTT SHAPIRO. LEGALITY 49(2011).
80. Scott Hershovitz. The End ofJurisprudence, 124 YALE 1.J. I160, 1163 (2015).
81. See Shapiro, supra note 79, at 3-4: Jefirey A. Pojanowski, Redrawing the Dividing Lines
Between Natural Law and Positivisn(s), 101 VA. L. REV. 1023. 1023 (2015): Gerald J. Postema.
Jurisprudence, the Sociable Science, 101 VA. L. REv. 869 (2015) David Enoch, Is General
Jurisprudence Interesting?. available at https://ssrn.con/abstract=2601537.
82. See, e.g., Roger Cotterrell, Why Jurisprudence is Not Legal Philosophy. 5 JURIS. 41 (2014)
Andrew Halpin. The Aeihodology of Jurisprudence: Thirty Years Offthe Point, 19 CAN. J.L. & JURIS.
67 19 (2006). This issue is discussed at length in Bcn-Zvi, supra note 25.
83. For more on this subject see Onri Ben-Zvi & Efi Zemach, Contract Theoty and the Limits of
Reason, TULSA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
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efficiency, and pluralism, 84 though other alternatives exist as well,8 ' and
new contenders appear regularly.6 However, things are not looking bright
here either, at least if one is interested in epistemic value. Virtually all
theories of contract have been met with intense criticism, and there is no
agreement across the spectrum of the field that any one theory meets the
criticisms in a manner that would render it an adequate theory of contract.
For example, "contract as promise" is conceptually incoherent for a
variety of reasons,7 economic theories of contract do not explain contract
doctrine,88 reliance theories fail to live up to their own internal
distinctions,9 and pluralism is considered "anti-theoretical."90
Taking all this into account, we may ask-after many decades of
thinking about contract, have we progressed from speculation and
suspicion to knowledge? We believe it is hard to answer this question
affirmatively. The different theories can formulate many answers to the
fundamental questions of contract law, but all rely on perspectives
deemed problematic and partial in important ways by contract theorists
themselves, to the extent that all of the answers are conditional: if one
accepts presupposition A (e.g. economic efficiency can explain contract
law), then X, Y, or Z follows. And scholars who do not subscribe to A
have no strong incentive to accept the conditional.9' Thus, another
standoff.92
84. See. e.g., PATRICK ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979)
CHARLES FRIED. CONTRACT AS PROMISE (2ND. ED.. 2015): GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF
CONTRACT (1974): ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACI LAw: AN ANALYSIS AND
CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW (1997): RICHARD POSNER, THE
EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (6th ed. 2003): Richard Craswell, In That Case. What Is the Ouestion9
Economics and the Demands of Contract Theory. 112 YALE. L J. 903 (2003): L.L. Fuller & W.R.
Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2). 46 YALE. L. J. 52 (1936). 46 YALE L.
J. 373 (1937): Roy Kreitner. On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 915
(2012).
85. See. e.g.. Randy Barnett. A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269. 271 (1986)
Peter Benson, Contract as a Transfer of Ornership. 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2007).
86. See. e.g.. Robin Bradley Kar, Contract as Empowerment, 83 U. CI l. L. REV. 759 (2016).
87. See PATRICK ATIYAH, PROMISES. MORALS AND LAW 128-29 (1981): ROBERT F. SCOTT &
JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 25 (3d ed. 2003): Peter Benson. Abstract Right and
the Possibility of a Vondistributive Conception of Contract: legel and Contemporary Contract
Theory. 10 CARDOZo L. REV. 1077, I115 (1989); Curtis Bridgeman., Liberalism and Freedom from
the Promise Theory of Contract, 67 Moo. L. REV. 684. 687 (2004).
88. Nathan B. Oman. The Failure of Economic Interpretations of the Law of Contract Damages.
64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 829 (2007): Eric Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law A.fter Three
Decades: Success or Failure?. 112 YALE. L. J. 829. 834 (2003).
89. See BRIAN 11. BIX, CONTRACT LAW-RLES, THEORY AND CONTEXT 134 (2012): Barnett.
supra note 85. at 276: Richard Craswell..Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CriI. L. Riv. 99 (2000).
90. Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory. 58 U. CIN. 1L. REv. 1283. 1283-84
(1990): Kreitner. supra note 84: Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott. Contract Theory and the Liints of
Contract Law. 133 YALE L.J. 541, 543 n.2 (2003).
91. See Schlag. supra note 67.
92. It would take this paper too far afield to examine why exactly legal scholarship does not often
excel in creating epistemic value. Instead, we list several possible explanations that have been
suggested elsewhere. It should not be surprising that these explanations are, theniselves. all partial and
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To conclude: in these fields, and in others, we find a phenomenon
scholars regularly view as worrisome-very little knowledge-production
is occurring. We wish to avoid the debate over how central a place
knowledge-production ought to take as a goal for legal academics.
Instead, our point is that knowledge production is surely not the only type
of value that counts. Furthermore, because of the unique narrative
structure of TPLS (the unreliable hero's journey), the epistemic failure, by
stoking the narrative's unreliability, contributes to the production of
aesthetic value. It would therefore be misguided to conclude that the
situation is dire simply because knowledge production does not occur. To
the extent that the standoff is a fact of life in field X (and even assuming
that one thinks that knowledge production is an important goal), one
should not conceive of field X simply as a failure, as some current
practitioners do.93 Instead, the more complete view is that field X is a
spectacular failure-an epistemic failure which produces aesthetic value.
The overall judgment of a field's success should take into account how it
fares across the intellectual spectrum. If one sees value in a tale of heroic
failure, the benefits of a standoff may even outweigh its disadvantages
(especially if one believes that knowledge production is not necessarily an
important goal for legal academia).94
We wish to emphasize that our proposition is a contingency, not a
concept. The hero's journey may very well end in success n the eys of the
reader (though for the reasons we outline in this article, we believe that
this scenario is probably rare), and a reliable, successful hero's journey
may also bring aesthetic value to the reader.9'
inconclusive. For example, Schilag suggests that several macro-level problems interfere with the legal
academic's attempts to produce knowledge (like the problem of sharply distinguishing a small and
well-defined object of inquiry and insulating it from the effects of the larger field within which it
usually resides, problems of entailment between law and the social: and problems with the temporal
nature of lcgal research). See Schlag, supra note 67 (manuscript at 23). A different explanation is that
at least certain theories become compromised because of the way they mirror existing ideological
debates, which are themselves undecidable. The theories are destined to internalize criticism until
they -reflect the conflict-ridden political and theoretical field [they have| promised to transcend."
Jeremy K. Kessler & David F. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life-Cycle Theory of Legal
Theories, 83 Ui. CHI. L. REv. 1819, 1838 (2016). A third explanation-though we are unsure whether
this truly is an explanation or just a restatement of the problem-is that law, or some of its domains,
are "essentially contested concepts." or even "second order essentially contested concepts." See
Richard Fallon, 'The Rule of Law as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Cot.. 1. REV. I
(1997); W.B. Gallie. Essentially Contested Concepts. 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'i 167 (1956)
Wibren van der Burg. Law as a Second-Order Essentiallv Contested Concept. 8 JURIS. 230 (2017):
Jeremy Waldron, Is The Rule of La' an Essentially Contested Concept (in 1lorida)?, 21 L. & PHIL.
137 (2002).
93. See, as an example, our discussion of jurisprudence.
94. For such a view, see 3en-Zvi & Zenach. supra note 83.
95. All the more so, given that, as mentioned. we do not define aesthetic value and recogonize that
there are several possible philosophical approaches to its definition. See supra note 6. It is certainly
possible that one derives substantial aesthetic value from reading a successful TPLS.
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CONCLUSION
The typical piece of legal scholarship follows a certain narrative
pattern-the hero's journey. A story about a heroic struggle in which a
menace in the form of a legal puzzle is solved by the author. However,
most readers read this story with deep skepticism, looking for errors, thus
treating the narrator as unreliable. This narrative structure-the unreliable
hero's journey-reveals a unique nexus between two kinds of value that
inhere in legal scholarship: epistemic and aesthetic. The lower the
epistemic value of a piece, the greater its aesthetic value: the discovery of
flaws increases the narrative's unreliability and thus generates aesthetic
value. Thus, legal scholarship is a multifaceted phenomenon, and a piece
of legal scholarship has the potential to produce many different types of
value. In this essay, we do not mean (nor do we think it is possible) to
capture all or even most of the values of TPLS. We simply wish to
demonstrate that an epistemic standoff in legal academia can and should
be evaluated through multiple prisms.
It is important to resist the temptation to draw normative conclusions
from our theory, If our argument has been persuasive, enough has been
accomplished-some light has been shed on the manner in which TPLS is
structured. In addition, in keeping with the fact that this essay is an
example of TPLS, we hope that it brought aesthetic joy to our readers.
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